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DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND STRATEGIES PDF

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cittadelmonte.info - Free ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online for free. both theoretical and empirical research directed toward the role of strategies in deductive reasoning. DownloadPDF MB Read online. Deductive reasoning contrasts with inductive reasoning, the kind of reasoning and logic, the main psychological models of deductive reasoning, and the.


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Deductive Reasoning and Strategies Schaeken, Walter. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. English Reasoning. Request PDF on ResearchGate | On Jan 1, , W. Schaeken and others published Deductive reasoning and strategies. Deductive Reasoning and Strategies. Category: Science. pdf download: PDF icon [Walter_Schaeken,_Gino_De_Vooght,cittadelmonte.info

This book brings together both theoretical and empirical research directed toward the role of strategies in deductive reasoning. It offers the first systematic attempt to discuss the role of strategies for deductive reasoning. The empirical chapters correspond well with the main issues in the study of deduction, namely propositional reasoning, spatial reasoning, and syllogistic reasoning. In addition, several chapters present a theoretical analysis of deduction, related to the concept strategy. The book also presents data about the role of strategies for statistical and social reasoning. This book will be of interest to researchers and students of cognitive psychology. It will also be of value to people working in Artificial Intelligence, because it highlights results on how humans use strategies while tackling deductive puzzles.

In fact, people in some countries nd our requirement of romantic love for marriage absurd. Intellectually, religious emotions are not creative but conservative. They attach themselves readily to the current view of the world and consecrate it.

They steep and dye intellectual fabrics in the seething vat of emotions. Religion and Enculturation continued Religion is one area in which it is easy to see the enculturation process and its effects on thinking. For example, most Americans are Christians, primarily because they were raised by Christian parents and not because of any choice they ever made about the matter. Most Christians have not objectively investigated alternative religions or looked extensively into the history of their own religion.

Most are unaware, for example, that the stories of Buddha, like the stories of Jesus, portray him as the son of a virgin and that the Buddhist code of ethics is in some ways more strict than that of the Christian ten commandments. And most Christians are probably unaware of the extent to which their own Christian doctrine has been shaped by mere mortals over the last seventeen hundred years.

Despite our moderate ignorance about our creed and those of others, most of us are certain that the beliefs of our faith are true, and the faith of others and their heroes is false. This we know without any investigation at all! Obviously our thoughts about religion are based more on feelings engendered by our faith and our culture than on critical thinking based upon knowledge. Therefore, we can see that resisting enculturation and its blinding inuence becomes essential to critical thinking, for it allows people to step back from their conditioning to look at issues more objectivelyissues such as abortion, proofs for Gods existence, new roles for women, and so on.

Answer honestly yes or no to the following questions. The purpose of this exercise is to examine the foundations of some of your thinking, not your conclusions, so dont be concerned with whether your answer is right or wrong.

In some instances there is no general agreement on what the right answer should be. Do you believe that the democratic form of government is the best kind of government in the world? Are you aware of the problems of democracy often cited by sociologists and people from nondemocratic countries?

Can you express the basic philosophy of alternative forms of government? Can you cite any positive aspects of either communism or socialism? Thinking Activity 2. Do you believe that abortion is wrong in most or all cases? Do you have good arguments to support your belief? Do you know at what moment a human being comes into existence? Do you know at what moment a developing embryo has human rights? Do you know at what moment a developing fetus becomes conscious? Do you know at what moment a developing fetus is capable of experiencing pain?

Can you cite any arguments used by pro-choice advocates to support abortion? Do you believe that a seed of an apple has the same value as an apple tree? Do you believe that capital punishment is justied for mass murderers? Do you know that capital punishment is a more expensive way to punish than life imprisonment because of the numerous and very expensive judicial appeals of the former? Have you seen any statistics that clearly show capital punishment to inhibit murder?

Do you believe there is a God? Have you ever heard of an argument against this idea? Can you present an argument against this idea? Do you believe that it is moral to use animals for medical experiment to make life better for human beings?

Do you believe that it would be moral for beings on another planet with intelligence superior to ours to use human beings as guinea pigs for the advancement of their alien culture? Have you ever seen experimental animals suffer in an experimental laboratory?

Do you know that pigs are blowtorched under anesthesia, bunnies have their eyes sewed shut, and monkeys have their heads smashed to study the effects of burn treatment, cosmetics, and concussion, respectively?

Have you ever read any argument against the use of animals in a laboratory? Can you cite such an argument now? Do you believe that ESP is nonsense? Have you read any studies by parapsychologists? Do you believe that if we cannot explain something it does not exist? Do you believe that humans are the most intelligent life forms in the universe? Do you know that there are billions of galaxies, each with billions of stars, so that if just one in 10 billion stars has a planet with life, there would be billions of planets with life?

Do you know that human life emerged on this planet in about 4. Do you believe that one racial group is innately superior to another? Do you know that Japanese score slightly higher on intelligence tests than whites? Do you know the extent to which the environment determines intelligence? Do you know the amount of genetic similarity among racial groups? Do you believe that America is the best country in the world?

Do you know that our infant mortality rate is higher than that of many other modern industrial countries? Do you know that the United States has one of the highest rates of violent crime in the world?

Do you know that the top 10 percent of the U. Do you believe that humans did not evolve from lower life forms but were created separately? Have you ever read a book on the evidence for evolution? Have you ever talked to a paleontologist, geologist, biochemist, or zoologist about evolution? Are you aware of any of the following? Homologous structures Vestigial traces Fossil discoveries DNA similarities How our embryonic ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny X.

A yes response to many of the questions above might be supported by sound reasoning and facts. The point is not to determine what is true about the issues but to illustrate the lack of both thinking and knowledge that tends to go into these beliefs.

A company that is doing pretty well in a business it knows will take over another company and ruin it. Why do companies make such big mistakes? One reason, I suggest, is ego. They want to show they are the biggest, smartest kids on the block.

When will these guys grow up? But we must also deal with other barriers that inhibit sound thinking, one of which is self-concept. Our self-concept is the way we view ourselves. It may be unhealthy if we see ourselves rather negatively as, for example, someone who is not very intelligent or very pretty; or it may be positive and healthy, as when we believe ourselves to be an attractive and worthwhile person. What goes into our idea of ourselves may include not only intelligence and attractiveness but a variety of other things: Thus, someone may view herself as an American, a card-carrying Republican, a 49er fan, a conservative Catholic, an animal rights activist, an exceptionally beautiful person, and one who would never buy anything but a Mercedes.

People vary in the degree to which they use their attributes, things, values, and affiliations to dene themselves and form their self-concept.

To some people these elements are central to the notion of self, such that they defend them as though they were defending themselves. Thus, we hear stories of people assaulting others because of some critical remark against their favorite.

When these contingencies become so central to our notion of who we are, we are not likely to think critically about them. Instead, we respond emotionally and may engage in ego-defense mechanisms, self-serving biases, and other distortions to ensure ourselves that what we identify with, that is, what we think we are, is good. Were we born with it? It seems not. Then have we made it our own creation? If so, have we done the right thing in creating it?

Does the self truly exist? Or is it only the minds idea? Whether our idea of self refers to a real or an illusory self, most will agree that we do spend a lot of time defending, maintaining, and creating that idea of self, as when we ght with others when they demean us, explain away a bad exam grade in order to appear more intelligent, or buy a new car to show off our wealth.

According to the Buddhist Walpola Rahula,. It is the source of all troubles in the world from personal conicts to wars between nations.

In short, to this false view can be traced all the evil in the world. Do you agree with Rahulas statement? Is the idea of self this dangerous? Can you cite instances to support it? Can you cite reasons to disagree with this statement? Pay special attention to the news for the next few days. To what extent can the troubles in the world be attributed to the idea of self? What about troubles in your own personal life? Reect on your recent arguments or moments of tension with others.

To what extent was your thinking affected by your need to protect your self-concept? Finally, as an exercise in self, try to respond to others today and tomorrow without a sense of self, without protecting an ego. How difficult was it? What were the results? Letting go means reducing as much as possible your identication with the constituents that you use to dene your self. You can begin this letting go by listing the major ideas you have of your self on the lines below.

Now imagine that you are fty years older. Which traits will be gone? Which people and things will have been replaced? Which activities will you no longer be doing? Most likely your idea of self today will not be your idea of self tomorrow, yet you will probably believe that you are the same person Philosophers debate whether a person is actually the same or not over time.

Should we, therefore, identify with those traits, activities, and loves to the point that it leads us to conceit, anger, defensiveness, and an inability to take constructive criticism when those cherished things are threatened?

On the other hand, would it be acceptable to believe in something so much that you would die for it? Do you think it would be possible to let go of your idea of self and still act to defend some principle? Some of the more basic ones that impact on our thinking are denial, projection, and rationalization.

Denial Experience with an alcoholic population suggests that certain individuals will deny to the point of dying.

What an unpleasant reality is varies from one person to another. For the alcoholic, it is his or her drinking problem. Thus, because of denial, many alcoholics are unable to think critically about their drinking behavior. Similarly, college students may deny that they are doing poorly in school, that they are lazy, or that their boyfriend or girlfriend really does not love them.

By keeping these unpleasant realities from conscious awareness, we protect ourselves from a reality that is unpleasant, but we also inhibit our ability to think objectively about the situation and to make intelligent decisions for our own and others best interests.

Projection There I see the beam in my own eye as a mote in my brothers eye. It is right there because I am unconscious of the beam in my own eye. Projection is the defense mechanism by which we see in others a part of ourselves that we cannot accept and do not recognize. We may believe others are hostile toward us when it is we who are hostile toward them. We may see in others our own incompetence and deceitfulness, which we are unable to accept in ourselves. We may see selsh motives in others, which are really the selsh motives in us which we do not consciously recognize.

In short, we see others not as they are, but as we are. Our thinking about ourselves and others is therefore grossly distorted when we engage in projection. Like denial, this interferes with our ability to think critically about ourselves, others, and our social situations. Notice in the example below how a mans perception of others as crazy and his desire to hurt someone seem to be projections of his own inner reality.

Well, how do you feel about all those things they are saying? What do you mean, feel? Theyre crazy. They want to see me destroyed. Oh, well, thats awful. Its scary to have people say crazy things about you. What would make them do that? Theyre jealous of me, that I have my wife; they must be trying to get her from me.

Well, of course, youre a proud man, and it must be difficult to have them talking about you like that. Now lets see if theres any way we can help you stay on top of things and keep in control. We can both agree that youre a strong man, and its important not to let it weaken you. Im strong. But Im very worried that her family might make me do something crazylike want to hurt someone.

Vaillant and Perry, , p. Of all the defense mechanisms, rationalization is perhaps the greatest inhibitor of clear thinking. Rationalization is distorted thinking that attempts to justify behavior motivated by self-interest or unacceptable drives.

It serves to protect us from bad feelings by, for example, turning selsh motives into honorable ones. For example, the captain of the cruise ship Oceanos, which sank in the Indian Ocean, was asked why he left his ship in a lifeboat while hundreds of passengers were still on board.

He replied that the order to abandon ship applies to everyone, and once the order is given it doesnt matter when the captain leaves. He also mentioned that he could control rescue operations better from the shore. In essence, rationalization is lying to ourselves about the real reasons for our behaviors and feelings.

It is essential that we believe in this lie for it to protect us; if we knew we were lying, it would do us no good. Many of us can recognize it during tax season: I prepare my taxes the way I do because of the way the government spends our money, you knowhundreds of dollars for a plain hammer and thousands of dollars for a toilet seat.

Its our duty as U. Maybe if we all held back a little Uncle Sam would get the message. For what each man wishes, that he also believes to be true.

If our motives are good they do not need to be rationalized. But sometimes, in spite of our good motives, undesirable consequences occur, consequences that threaten our self-esteem. The actions of others can also threaten our self-esteem.

Such ego-threatening situations can lead us to cognitive biases. These biases in our thinking and perception that serve to protect or elevate our self-esteem are called self-serving biases. As noted above, we do not always think about and perceive things as they are, for that would often mean looking at ourselves in an unpleasant light. Consequently, most people tend to see what they need to see and what they want to see in order to maintain or strengthen positive feelings about themselves Maslow, One aspect of the self-serving bias is the tendency to take credit for our successes and to blame our failures on external factors Zuckerman, ; Bradley, For example, a student failing an exam might attribute her failure to an unfair test or an incompetent instructor rather than her poor study habits.

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And when politicians lose elections, they are likely to attribute their loss to negative campaigning by their opponent or a lack of funds necessary to get their message across rather than their own personality aws or their own awed political perspective.

Whereas we often attribute our failures to situational factors and our successes to personal ones, a second aspect of the self-serving bias is the tendency to make opposite attributions when judging the behavior of others that threatens our own self-esteem.

When a student competitor in college gets a better grade than we do, we may nd it threatening to our self-esteem and attribute it to luck or some privileged relationship with the instructor. Yet, when others fail, we may look to their character for an explanation and ascribe their failure to their incompetence, ignorance, or laziness. The tendency to engage in ego defenses and self-serving biases should decrease as our psychological health increases.

As a healthy person we are better able to own up to the totality of who and what we are, both positive and negative Jung, When we can truly accept ourselves as we are with our faults, that is, when we can think of ourselves as worthwhile persons in spite of our failings, then we have less need to repress, deny, project, or make misattributions to protect ourselves. As healthier people we are less threatened by the successes of others and more able to tolerate our own failures; we own up to our mistakes and give credit to others.

In sum, we think better for being better. Other Attribution Errors Our attributions about our own and others behaviors are often wrong because they are biased by our need to protect our self-esteem. But they can also go wrong for other reasons. For example, if we saw a young man speeding by in a red convertible with a beautiful lady by his side we would probably attribute his behavior to immaturity and showing off. This is because of a tendency we have to attribute the behavior of others to their personal traits instead of to their situation.

Oftentimes our internal attributions are wrong and the situation is the real force behind the behavior. In such instances we have committed the fundamental attribution error. In the example above the student is speeding to the hospital because his gorgeous wife is about to deliver a baby.

The actor-observer bias extends the fundamental attribution error one more step by stating that we tend to make internal attributions when observing the behavior of others but situational attributions when assessing our own behavior except when examining our success.

Thus, employees observers may attribute a managers strict rules to the managers rigid personality, whereas the manager actor explains the rules as necessary to deal with the stresses and pressures coming from her superiors. On the other hand, a manager the observer now may see her unproductive employees as lazy and unmotivated, whereas they the actors perceive their unproductive behavior as a natural consequence of working for an insensitive, authoritarian personality.

The differences in attribution are probably rooted in differences in points of view: Fortunately, this bias can be minimized by having each side empathize with the other Regan and Totten, Have you ever made an erroneous attribution for someone elses behavior?

Have you ever been victim of such an attribution? Self-Serving Biases? Self-serving biases are cognitive distortions that put us in a favorable position.

The statements below come from the insurance forms of car-accident victims who were asked to summarize the accident. Are these self-serving biases or just grammatical mistakes? A pedestrian hit me and went under my car. As I approached the intersection a sign suddenly appeared in a place where no sign had ever appeared before. My car was legally parked as it backed into the other vehicle. The indirect cause of this accident was a little guy in a small car with a big mouth. An invisible car came out of nowhere, struck my vehicle, and vanished.

The telephone pole was approaching. I was attempting to swerve out of the way, when it struck my front end. I had been driving for forty years when I fell asleep at the wheel. To avoid hitting the car in front of me, I struck the pedestrian. The pedestrian had no idea which direction to run, so I ran over him. I pulled away from the side of the road, glanced at my mother-in-law, and headed for the embankment. Therefore, it is worthwhile to look at the dark side of ourselves and accept it as part of who we are.

So as not to walk away from such an exercise depressed and full of loathing about ourselves, it is important to write down our positive characteristics as well.

At home in a private place, write down ten positive characteristics of your personality. Then, be honest with yourself and write down some of your less-positive characteristics that you have not really looked at before.

To help you identify those dark elements, which the psychologist Carl Jung called the shadow, reect back on how you have reacted to criticism from others in the past and consider these statements by one of Jungs students, M. If you feel an overwhelming rage coming up in you when a friend reproaches you about a fault, you can be fairly sure that at this point you will nd a part of your shadow, of which you are unconscious.

It is particularly in contacts with people of the same sex that one stumbles over both ones own shadow and those of other people. When an individual makes an attempt to see his shadow, he becomes aware of and often ashamed of those qualities and impulses he denies in himself but can plainly see in other people such things as egotism, mental laziness, and sloppiness; unreal fantasies, schemes, and plots; carelessness and cowardice; inordinate love of money and possessionsin short, all the little sins about which he might previously have told himself: That doesnt matter; nobody will notice it, and in any case other people do it too.

Jung, , pp. Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitors cup full, and then kept on pouring. The professor watched the overow until he no longer could restrain himself.

It is overfull. No more will go in! Like this cup, Nan-in said, you are full of your own opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you rst empty your cup? We tend to perceive and think about others and situations in terms of the ideas we have already formed about them. These ideas are called schema. Often we distort the truth to make it t into our existing schema, or we notice only those aspects of others behavior or ideas which fit into our existing ideas about them. In other words, human beings are reluctant to change their perceptions and ideas to accommodate the facts accommodation ; instead, it is easier to fit our observations and thinking into our existing schemata assimilation.

If our prior experience with someone is that he is extremely selsh and we form an idea of him as a selsh person, then we tend to see his actions as selsh. If he suggests a new policy at work to increase morale and productivity, we wonder about the selsh motives that must be underlying his new policy.

Surely he cannot be interested in the well-being of others and the companys productivity. Similarly, if a teacher believes that a student is not very bright, frequent questions from that student may be interpreted by the teacher as verication of the students ignorance. On the other hand, if the teacher is told that a student is intelligent and highly motivated, the students questions may be seen as reecting that persons insight and motivation.

Imagine what your reaction would be if you heard that a dictator was freeing some political prisoners and giving millions of dollars to the poor in his country. You would probably either discount the information as mere propaganda or question his motives, believing that he was trying to manipulate his people for some reason.

His behavior would not likely cause you to change your perception of him from a ruthless dictator to a compassionate benefactor. A good example of a schema that inuences the way we perceive and think is the stereotype. Stereotypes are simplistic, biased views about members of a certain group. We learn stereotypes from a variety of sources. Sometimes we over-generalize from our limited experience with members of a group.

Often we learn our parents stereotypes by listening and observing them, and we. Whatever their source, stereotypes have a powerful effect on our thinking.

It is important to realize that stereotypes are inaccurate. They assume that groups are more homogeneous than they are. For some reason when it comes to our group we see the richness and diversity of its members, but when it comes to our perception of other groups, we assume that their members are all alike.

On what basis can we possibly assume so? Certainly, similarities exist among group members but not to the degree that stereotypes imply.

Deductive Reasoning and Strategies

An open mind is essential to critical thinking. But there is no easy recipe for acquiring an open mind, especially regarding prejudice. Negative thoughts toward a minority group may go, but negative feelings often linger on.

Those feelings may lead us to continuing negative behaviors and attitudes toward a group. Although stereotypes in particular, and schemata in general, often distort our thinking, sometimes we do change our views of people and situations when we experience facts contradicting our schema. Some research suggests that this accommodation is most likely to occur when the new information is moderately discrepant with our schemata Bochner and Insko, If an idea is very similar to our existing views, we are likely to minimize the difference and assimilate it into our existing schema, thus not modifying our views.

Likewise, if the information is highly discrepant, it simply cannot t into our schema and we reject it. For example, if typical Christians were exposed to arguments that Jesus never existed and that the entire New Testament is a myth, they would nd this information very discrepant and would probably reject it without the least consideration.

On the other hand, information that Jesus was unusually friendly with a political group whose intent was to overthrow the Romans might simply be assimilated into their schema of Jesus as a spiritual leader, who just happened to appeal to some political groups bent on overthrowing Roman rulers. Little or no change would be made in their concept of Jesus. Moderately discrepant information, however, is too different to be easily assimilated and yet not so different that it must be rejected.

Thus, if we are likely to change our views in the face of evidence, moderately discrepant information will most likely, but not necessarily, lead to that change. Can you imagine any real or ctitious revelation about Jesus that could be considered by most Christians as moderately discrepant with their views? They are in part what separates humans from machines and the lower animals, for machines can compute but they can not experience joy. And animals may nd themselves attached to others, but they do not love them.

Emotions give our world taste and richness, joy and surprise, but also pain and sorrow. Emotions can affect and inspire thought, said William James, but he also said they can destroy it. Later in this book we look at how emotions can give birth to thinking, but for now our attention focuses on their inhibiting inuence, on their capacity to bury, twist, and fragment the thinking process and take it to the depths of the irrational.

Some philosophers, like Seneca, considered it wholly without value:. Seneca sees absolutely no value in anger. No provocation justies it, no situation permits it, and no benet is gained by it. Once allowed, anger entirely consumes its possessor and renders dull his capacity for reasoning and sensible action. Averill, , p. Anger has destroyed intimacy, thwarted good judgment, motivated senseless killings, inspired numerous wars, and probably burned more bridges in the career paths of men and women than any other single force.

It also distorts our perception of a situation, colors our ability to think critically about it, and impairs our self-control.

The cause of anger may be a threat to something we hold dear. It may also be due to frustration, which is often caused by the blocking of a goal, or even by stress and hormonal changes in our bodies.

No matter what the source, it is important not to make important decisions in the heat of anger, for good thinking does not prevail during such moments. Instead, we want to release the tension caused by the anger and strike out, hurt, or destroy. The short-term goal of releasing tension can supersede and crush years of careful deliberation and planning as we say or do things we know we should. The aspiring businesswoman ruins her career by berating her boss for making a poor decision, or a man angry at his ancs selsh behavior castigates her for all her personal faults and breaks off the engagement.

Although anger may inspire great speeches, it often throws thinking in the backseat as our emotions take control. Earlier we mentioned how previous knowledge, like stereotypes and other schemata, can distort our thinking. Feelings can also affect thinking in a similar way. For example, anger can not only overrule our thinking, but it can distort it so that we believe that what we are doing is justied and rational. For example, a parent may spank a child because of the parents frustration with the child and need to release anger.

The parent may then rationalize the aggression against the child by claiming that such punishment was necessary to teach the child appropriate behaviorin spite of the fact that psychologists have for years been saying that appropriate behavior can be taught by nonviolent methods and that such spanking can be harmful to the child.

The parent does not acknowledge the real motivation for the behavior. Dealing with Anger If anger can lead to unthinking behavior or override our better judgment, we need to lessen its impact.

We offer ve suggestions. First, do not vent your anger: The psychological rationales for ventilating anger do not stand up under experimental scrutiny. The weight of the evidence indicates precisely the opposite: If you keep quiet about momentary irritations and distract yourself with pleasant activity until your fury simmers down, chances are you will feel better, and feel better faster, than if you let yourself go in a shouting match.

Tavris, , pp. This is not to say that one should stew for days with unabated anger. If the anger does not eventually subside, although usually it does, an attempt should be made to calmly talk about the matter. Pick a time when the other person is not angry and will therefore be more likely to listen. Second, get advice about your chosen course of action from others who are not angry. They may be able to give you a clearer perspective and prevent X. Third, become assertive.

Anger is sometimes caused by continuous victimization. Being assertive means standing up for your rights in a nonaggressive manner that diminishes the potential for defensiveness in the other person.

Unlike with anger, when one is assertive, one has self-control. Bear in mind, however, that it is irrational to believe that life should always treat us justly. In other words, dont overdo it. Fourth, learn to relax and to practice other stress-management strategies. Reducing the stress in our lives and practicing relaxation exercises regularly can help us control the frequency of our anger.

Lastly, dont get angry. This may sound simplistic; however, when we consider that anger is rooted in the meaning we give to the events around us, as opposed to the events themselves, it is reasonable to try to alter that initial perception and prevent the anger from occurring altogether.

Psychologists call this cognitive restructuring or reappraisal. For example, if we perceive that someone is trying to slight us in some way, we might ask ourselves if there is another reason for his behavior.

It might be possible, for example, that he is unaware of the impact his behavior has on us. Empathy, identifying with the position of the other person, sometimes helps us to make these reappraisals. Or we might want to put things in proper perspective. For example, if we were counting on someone to mow the lawn for us today and he did not, we can ask ourselves how important it is that the lawn be mowed today as opposed to tomorrow. Aristotle said, But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right waythis is not easy Nichomachean Ethics.

This statement suggests that there is a place for anger. Even Jesus got angry: And making a kind of whip of cords, he drove them all out of the temple, also the sheep and oxen, and he poured out the money of the changers and overturned the tables John 2: In what situations, if any, do you think anger is an appropriate response? What would be the right way to express it?

Be careful that you do not rationalize your past behavior. We dene it more prosaically as. Most people have experienced it in romantic love, whence the statement Love is blind. In love or wherever it is found, passion is able to unseat reason, and rational thought becomes rationalized thought. How many women regretably become pregnant because they surrender to the heat of passion?

How many lives have been lost to the passion for the high of drugs, and how many good relationships to passion felt for someone else? When we love a person or thing, we do not see the dark side; we tend only to justify our desires. Romantic lovers, for example, idealize their partners and often nd them without faults.

Contrary opinions from friends and family are seen as motivated by jealousy or born of misunderstanding. Our passion may be our religion, our food, or our drugs. It may be sports, the television, a person, a home, or a material object. Whatever the source, we tend to immerse ourselves in our object of passion, revel briey in its taste, and only later, if ever, nd our reason again.

Depression When our object of passion is lost, we may nd ourselves dysphoric or seriously depressed. This response is echoed in the story of Romeo and Juliet and the numerous young and old alike every year who commit suicide out of a deep sense of loss. But the loss of something dear to us is only one cause of depression.

Other causes include biochemical factors, severe stress, a sense of hopelessness, lack of sunlight, and illogical thinking. Of particular interest to us are the effects that depression may have on thinking.

Several studies on depression support the idea that irrational cognitions are correlated with depression.

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The source of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Cognition 45, Nisbett, R. Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, Polk, T. Deduction as verbal reasoning. Psychological Review, , Reber, A. Implicit learning and tacit knowledge. Oxford University Press. Rips, L. The psychology of proof. Roberts, M. Deduction rules or mental models or both. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46A, Stanovich, K.

Cognitive ability and variation in selection task performance. Thinking and Reasoning, 4, Stevenson, R. Deductive reasoning and the distinction between implicit and explicit processes. Deduction from uncertain premises. Wason, P. Dual processes in reasoning? Cognition, 3, Woodworth, R. An atmosphere effect in syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18, Roberts This chapter summarizes research into individual differences in the use of strategies for deduction tasks, and discusses its importance.

It is divided into three sections. First, key terms are defined, and the major findings on strategy usage in the deduction literature are reviewed on a task-by-task basis.

Second their importance with respect to the arguments of Roberts are discussed; it is suggested that deduction strategies are not just an interesting area to study, but that they also render the identification of fundamental reasoning processes somewhat difficult. Finally, four different approaches to the understanding of individual differences in strategy selection are discussed, and those most likely to yield interesting findings are identified.

The study of individual differences in the use of deductive reasoning strategies has been a minority interest for many years. However, the steady accumulation of findings means that not only can different strategy users be identified for many deduction tasks, but also that significant advances have been made in understanding why different strategies are chosen and how they develop.

Although research into these issues may, on the surface, lack the glamour of the pursuit of fundamental reasoning processes see, e. First, given the overwhelming evidence that people can and do use different strategies for deduction tasks, any attempt to explain human deduction that ignores these must be incomplete. Second, researchers such as Siegler e. Individual Differences in Deductive Reasoning Strategies There have been many attempts to define the term strategy over the years, but some common themes generally emerge.

A strategy is "any procedure that is nonobligatory and goal directed" p. Hence a strategy is any set of cognitive processes which, in theory, could be modified or dispensed with.

This definition sidesteps the issue of whether either knowledge of strategies, or the processes of determining which to use, are conscious. However, it may still be too strong for some researchers in the field because it reduces the status of hard-wired processes to strategies if they can be substituted for by other processes. Roberts thus suggests a weaker, and less contentious definition: A reasoning strategy is "a set of cognitive processes which have been shown to be used for solving certain types of deductive reasoning tasks, but for which there is not sufficient evidence to assert that these processes themselves constitute all or part of the fundamental reasoning mechanism" p.

This suggests what might be a candidate for a strategy and, as shown later, in practice is identical to Siegler's definition. The majority of research into deduction strategies has been concerned simply with identifying these rather than explaining why people differ. It is relatively easy to classify the various strategies into a small number of categories, and these are described next. For a fuller description, the reader should consult Evans, Newstead, and Byrne Spatial Strategies These have been proposed in various forms by many researchers see, e.

For example, the relative height of a set of objects might be represented as a linear array, with the tallest entity at the top and the shortest at the bottom. Thus, a spatial representation can be conceptualized as a mental diagram, although this need not take the form of a mental image.

The mental models theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne is the most highly developed theory that has the spatial representation of information as its basis. The degree of abstractedness of the representation is an issue that is open to disagreement, but all theorists agree that these rule processes are either distinct from spatial strategies, or that verbal strategies are somehow fundamental to reasoning, and that spatial strategies either may be developed with practice Rips, b, p.

Deduction rule theories of reasoning e. Task-Specific Shortcut Strategies When solving a deduction task, people may develop shortcut strategies that can result in massive gains in performance. Usually, they are extremely taskspecific, often they are even specific to certain presentation formats.

Sometimes, detailed representations are dispensed with altogether, and people are able to obtain a solution directly from the problem statements. For this reason, these strategies are sometimes termed representation-free strategies or perceptual strategies e.

However, not all task-specific shortcut strategies are entirely representation free. For some, intermediate steps and running totals may nonetheless need to be stored, and to exclude these from this category would probably be a mistake. The nature of these strategies is discussed in detail under the specific tasks concerned. The action of task-specific shortcut strategies may often resemble the action of simple rules e.

The sets of rules posited for a verbal strategy are generally taken to form a closed, coherent system which is domain-free and cannot easily be modified with practice. Hence, it is frequently asserted that whereas the Modus Ponens rule is a natural component of a rule system, the Modus Tollens rule is not possessed e.

By contrast, task-specific shortcut strategies may be learned rapidly under the right circumstances with little or no practice. There are no obvious constraints on what can be learned or discovered, but these discoveries are likely to be very domain specific and hence difficult to generalize to other tasks. The foregoing is not an exhaustive taxonomy of the ways in which deduction problems can be solved.

When problems are phrased in terms of real-life situations, it is possible for people to apply their knowledge and beliefs, which may either interact with, or bypass their reasoning processes altogether. In addition, it has also been proposed that context dependent rules may be important determinants of performance e. Finally, the action of preconscious heuristics may also have a role to play in determining solutions.

These focus attention on aspects of a problem that warrant closer scrutiny, and it has been claimed that they can at the very least bias performance on certain tasks, and at other times can entirely account for performance e. An ongoing feature of much deduction research has concerned the nature of the fundamental reasoning mechanism.

This is a notional, hard-wired device that underlies all deductive reasoning. Much research is intended to show not just the primacy of one type of strategy over the rest, but also mutual exclusivity, such that a type of strategy is used for all deductive reasoning. Others draw back from the assertion of mutual exclusivity, but still wish to show primacy; hence the proposed processes are fundamental to deductive reasoning but are not always observed because of the use of reasoning strategies.

These draw upon different and nonfundamental sets of processes hence overlaying and obscuring the fundamental mechanism. The issue of whether either camp has convincing evidence for their case is beyond the scope of this chapter, and Evans et al.

This should also be referred to for further details of any of the following major reasoning tasks with which the reader is unfamiliar. As is shown later, the existence of individual differences in the use of reasoning strategiesqualitative individual differenceshas important implications for the resolution of the fundamental reasoning mechanism debate, and because of this, such differences are often ignored by researchers.

Where they are mentioned, the reader should make a distinction between: Interstrategic differences are the focus of this chapter. Hence, wherever individual differences are referred to, readers should assume that they are interstrategic unless informed otherwise. SentencePicture Verification For sentencepicture verification, people are typically given a series of trials in which simple sentences describing two objects e.

The task is to determine whether each picture is a true depiction of its sentence. Although neglected by deduction researchers, the task fits with standard definitions of deduction, and has produced some of the most important findings in the strategies literature.

Initially, Clark and Chase and Carpenter and Just asserted that all people use verbalpropositional processes to solve the task, so that each sentence is encoded verbally, and its picture is converted into a verbal proposition e. For this, each sentence is converted into a spatial representation, and directly compared with the picture on the display.

In support of this, they found that for people whose response times fitted the verbal strategy well, their verbal ability test score predicted performance, but not their spatial ability. The reverse was found for those fitted the verbal strategy poorly.

These findings have been replicated by Coney Kroll and Corrigan have shown that changes in task format can derail the spatial strategy easily, causing spatial strategy users to change to the verbal strategy. More recent work by Marquer and Pereira and Roberts, Wood, and Gilmore casts doubt on this overall analysis of the task. It is difficult to distinguish between the spatial strategy and a modified verbal strategy in which negatives are recoded into positives, so that for example, ''not above" is recoded to "below.

Categorical Syllogisms A categorical syllogism traditionally consists of a pair of premises followed by a conclusion. The premises link two end terms via a middle term, the latter appearing in both premises. The task is usually to generate or evaluate a conclusion linking C with A. For example, if "All of the engineers are chess players" and "Some of the chess players are not chefs", then does it follow that "Some of the chefs are engineers"? Explicit searches for strategy differences for this task are rare, but Ford presents a particularly interesting subject by item analysis, in which concurrent verbal protocols, and people's notes were used in order to identify strategies.

The majority had a clear preference, with approximately one third relying on a spatial strategy. A further third appeared to be relying on a verbal strategyanalogous to the use of Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens rulesin order to determine the relationship between entities, and to substitute an end term from one premise for the middle term in another, with appropriate modifications to the quantifiers as a result. Ford only presented valid syllogisms, and it is possible that had she used others, then other strategies might have been observed too.

For instance, Gallotti, Baron, and Sabini found that some people spontaneously developed the two-somes rule, that is, for any syllogisms where the word some appears twice, there is never a valid conclusion. Although termed a deduction rule by Galotti et al.

Different strategy users have also been identified by Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick, and Wynn on the basis of expected errors for particular trials. For example, if either or both quantifiers are particular i. Users of another task-specific strategy; matching were also identified. Here, the quantifier of the conclusion is chosen to match the most conservative quantifier of either premise, where no is the most conservative, followed by "some not," "some," and finally "all.

However, on the basis of the small numbers of individual difference studies conducted so far, it is far from obvious whether there is a natural strategy for this task. All of the earlier studies have used syllogisms with neutral premises and conclusions. Conclusions can also be devised such that they may conflict with, or be in line with people's beliefs e.

Framing syllogisms in this way tends to cause strong belief bias effects which are difficult to remove, particularly for invalid conclusions. Attempts to see whether some people are more likely to succumb to their beliefs than others have been largely unsuccessful. For example, Evans, Barston, and Pollard found that whether or not an individual succumbed to belief bias for one trial appeared not to be a predictor for other trials.

This finding is surprising because it suggests that quantitative individual differences in the degree of belief bias are entirely due to random errors of measurement, that is, statistical noise, and hence further investigation of this topic is desirable before ruling out the existence of individual differences. Linear Syllogisms and Relational Reasoning Linear syllogisms require people to make deductions about spatial relationships between entities.

Universal theories have been proposed for this task from the outset, with De Soto, London, and Handel suggesting that all people used a spatial strategy, in which a mental ladder of the terms was constructed, whereas Clark suggested that any perceived spatial representation of information served no functional purpose, and that a verbal strategy accounted for the performance of all.

Here, problem premises are represented as unintegrated propositions e. Finally, Sternberg suggested that everyone uses a mixed strategy, in which people first represent the premises propositionally, and then use these to construct a spatial representation. Here, an initial and largely unsuccessful attempt was made to train people to use various strategies, but by using multiple regression on the response data of individuals, it was possible to classify people into one of four strategy groups: In addition to these strategies, there are many possible task-specific shortcut strategies that should be regarded as being distinct from the verbal strategy mentioned before.

Strategies are usually detected via performance datatheir use typically speeds performance and raises accuracyalthough concurrent and retrospective protocols, psychometric test data, and eye-movements data have also been utilized.

As one example, Wood presented extended syllogisms such as: John and Ian both appear on the left, but only John appears on the right, and so Ian must be the taller. However, it is easy to devise problems that cannot be solved by this strategy, and for linear syllogisms, all task-specific shortcuts may be defeated by appropriately designed items, or by modified task formatsthe shortcut strategies all rely on information being presented simultaneously, that is, parallel presentation. Where these strategies are encouraged, some practice is usually required before they can develop, their use being preceded by verbal or more often spatial strategies.

This prevalence of task-specific shortcut strategies has led seekers of the fundamental reasoning mechanism to modify the task in an attempt to eliminate them. Serial presentation is one possible solutionwhether by presenting problem statements in writing one at a time, or verbally. In addition, Byrne and Johnson-Laird used problems in which two-dimensional spatial arrays had to be constructed. Using negated terms, disjunctions, additional premises, and varying their believability all add to the diversity of problems that can be tested, and other conditional reasoning tasks such as truth-table evaluations and the notorious Wason four-card selection task are possible.

However, unlike other reasoning tasks, evidence of interstrategic differences between individuals simply does not exist despite the diversity of responses that are observed.

For example, there is considerable variation in the likelihood that the strictly illogical Denial of the Antecedent and Affirmation of the Consequent inferences will be made see, e. In addition, George has observed two modes of responding when the believability of the premises is manipulated: Some people never succumb to this manipulation, always making the valid Modus Ponens inference, whereas for the rest, the likelihood of this inference varies according to premise believability.

However, all of these findings can be explained in terms of intrastrategic differences. A closer look at the literature suggests a possible reason for this. It is often accepted that it is very difficult to produce distinct predictions which can distinguish between, say, mental model and deduction rule theories e. Hence, debates among people seeking the fundamental reasoning mechanism often move to discussions of theoretical coherence, testability, generality, and psychological plausibility, and away from theoretical predictions and data.

Put simply, both types of theory can account for the same patterns of data equally well, and this prevents the identification of the dominant strategy of an individual even more so than overall for a group. This is because strategy identification procedures require much more precision when applied to an individual than when determining the dominant strategy of a group. In addition, many of the rules suggested by deduction rule theorists are indistinguishable from task-specific shortcuts.

For example, although deduction rule theorists hypothesize that all people posses the Modus Ponens rule, this could easily be explained in terms of a shortcut developed as a result of using mental models repeatedly to make this inference, rather than as a fundamental, innate rule. Hence, if people are not reasoning, we cannot expect differences in reasoning strategy.

However, there appears to be a small minority who can consistently get the tasks correct, and Stanovich and West a suggested these people are successfully using analytic processes.

Again, given both the difficulties with identifying individual differences in conditional reasoning strategies in general, and the requirement to test many hundreds of people before an adequate group of analytic reasoners could be assembled, this means that the effort entailed in determining which of these people are using either spatial or verbal strategies is unlikely to be rewarded. To summarize, the various conditional reasoning tasks are unlikely to prove to be an interesting domain for those seeking individual differences in strategy usage, although the possibility of the development of improved techniques for investigation cannot be entirely ruled out.

This would almost certainly depend on the radical developments in both mental models and deduction rules theories, or the application of new methodologies.

This failure should be regarded an isolated phenomenon in the field of deduction; clear individual differences in strategy usage are observable elsewhere.

Other Deduction Tasks Truth-Teller Problems These problems require a person to determine which of several characters either always tell the truth traditionally known as knights or always tell lies known as knaves from their statements. This identification has so far been at the level of the group rather than the individual. However, these short-cuts represent intrastrategic differences rather than interstrategic differences: They are variations in how mental models might be used to solve the task, rather than suggestions for strategies that replace mental models altogether.

As such, these individual differences are outside of the scope of this chapter. Family Relationship Problems These problems e. A spatial strategy appears to be the natural means of solution, in which a grid of relations is navigated. Some people are able to improve their performance at the task by generating task-specific shortcuts, their protocols indicating an awareness of certain patterns.

For example, the term fathers' father always translates into moving up a grid twice, and this up-up operation always means great-something, while up-across-down always means cousin.

Hence, rather than having to keep track of individual transitions, recurring patterns can be linked directly to solutions, thus considerably reducing the load on working memory and improving performance. Compass Point Directions Tasks These tasks e. The natural strategy again appears to be spatial, with people representing the entire path and reading the bearing of the final location in relation to the start.

The shortcut strategy of cancellation is discovered and reported by some people. Here, opposite steps are canceled, with those that remain constituting the correct answer. A running total of cancellations appears to be far less demanding on working memory than a spatial representation of the path, and the use of this strategy reduces both times and error rates dramatically. Summary Although studies into individual differences in deductive reasoning strategy usage are not numerous, clear patterns emerge.

For some tasks, verbal and spatial strategy users can be identified relatively easily if care is taken, although the replication of some isolated studies would be desirable. Task-specific shortcut strategies appear to be widespread, usually enabling dramatic improvements in performance; only for categorical syllogisms do some shortcuts inevitably lead to errors.

Even here, given the difficulty of some types of syllogism, it may well be the case that people who use the atmosphere or matching strategies are better off in any case.

Critical-Thinking-Strategies.pdf

Finally, concerning the current mental modeldeduction rule debate, a clear natural strategy appears to be identifiable for some tasks; verbal for sentencepicture verification and spatial for two-dimensional spatial relations, family relationships, and compass point directions tasks.

For linear syllogisms, the natural strategy appears to be mixed, although the major mechanism of inference is a spatial array. Finally, for categorical syllogisms, conditional reasoning tasks, and truth-teller problems, there is no clear natural strategy.

To this end, the arguments of Roberts concerning the problem of individual differences are still relevant. Hence, "if a theory of reasoning is being proposed which is intended to describe the processes used by all people for all reasoning tasks, then what is the status of this theory if it is subsequently found that not all subjects [sic] are using the same processes?

However, no distinction was previously made between verbal strategies such as those based on deduction rules and task-specific shortcuts. By making the distinction here, it is necessary to update some of the arguments. The problem of individual differences affects any research intended to identify the fundamental reasoning mechanism.

If it is to be proposed that mental models or deduction rules are fundamental to all deduction, then how does a discovery of a subset of people who use the wrong strategy affect the original assertion? Where this problem is acknowledged, it is usually claimed that reasoning strategies may occasionally overlay and obscure the fundamental processes.

However, this assertion automatically leads to the question of how a fundamental process and an overlaid strategy may be distinguished by means of experimental data. The extent to which any experiment can distinguish between these is almost certainly being overestimated.

Although data may be used to identify the processes that are used to perform a particular task by the majority of people, to conclude from this that these processes are somehow fundamental requires several assumptions. These include the following: If the need to address these assumptions is ignored, it is easy to show that experimental data cannot be used to identify the fundamental reasoning mechanism. Suppose, first, that this really does exist, but its processes can be overlaid by reasoning strategies.

What would we expect to observe? We might see people using a variety of strategies for a variety of deduction tasks, precisely the pattern shown in the previous review.

Without knowing whether or which tasks provide a window through which the fundamental mechanism can be observed, how could we know where to look for it? Now suppose that there is no fundamental reasoning mechanism, no processes are privileged and all constitute reasoning strategies. We would expect to see exactly the same pattern of behavior, and now speculating on which task provides a window through which to observe the fundamental processes is a futile exercise.

In the years since Roberts was published, the only citations have been neutraldrawing readers' attention to the argumentsor being in full agreement with them. The citations that are at the very least neutraland possibly receptiveare those of Evans et al.

The citations that broadly agree with the arguments are those of Aronson ; Barrouillet ; George , Yule and Stanovich and West b. The current author has been unable to locate any attempt to resolve the problem of individual differences in print to date. Because there are no attempts for the current author to discuss, instead, let us assume that a fundamental reasoning mechanism does exist, and that tasks exist that enable its actions to be viewed directly.

Given these, the remainder of this section considers several possible suggestions for identifying the fundamental reasoning mechanism. Unfortunately, even if these two assumptions are valid, the identification of the fundamental processes is still a virtual impossibility. The Unanimous Verdict The unanimous verdict is based on the premise that the strategy used by everyone for all deduction tasks must be fundamental to all deductive reasoning. Unfortunately, the numerous studies demonstrating individual differences in deduction strategies mean that this simply does not apply.

However, coupled with following suggestions, a resurrection of the unanimous verdict might be possible. Certain Tasks, Where a Mixture of Strategies Are Observed, Are Outside the Scope of the Universal Reasoning Theory One possible solution is to reject tasks in which individual differences in strategy usage have been observed, hence assuming that only strategically pure tasks provide a clear window through which the basic processes of the fundamental reasoning mechanism can be observed see, e.

However, if we reject not just the tasks in which individual differences may be observed, but also, to be on the safe side, tasks where it is difficult to be certain whether or not there are individual differences in the use of reasoning strategies conditional reasoning and truth-teller problems , this leaves no tasks at all. A less stringent criterion would be to reject tasks without a clear dominant strategy, also leaving aside conditional reasoning and truth-teller problems because of the difficulties in identifying the dominant processes.

The assumption here is that tasks with an obvious dominant strategy provide a clear window, free of strategic pollution, through which the fundamental processes may be observed.

This leaves sentencepicture verification verbal strategy dominant , linear syllogisms mixed strategy dominant , and the two-dimensional relational inference, family relationship, and compass point directions tasks all spatial strategy dominant.

No winner can be declared on this basis, at least one of these tasks is overwhelmingly polluted by a reasoning strategy, and the foregoing assumption becomes false by definition. However, if there were a sound reason for rejecting sentencepicture verification, this would leave us with tasks having spatial representations as the dominant means of inference.

The book also presents data about the role of strategies for statistical and social reasoning. This book will be of interest to researchers and students of cognitive psychology. It will also be of value to people working in Artificial Intelligence, because it highlights results on how humans use strategies while tackling deductive puzzles. Search all titles. Search all titles Search all collections. Your Account Logout. Deductive Reasoning and Strategies.

Edition 1st Edition. First Published Imprint Routledge. DOI https:

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